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NomE
THE KENTUCKY OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE ACT:
NATURE AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT

The purpose of workmen's compensation legislation is to create

employer liability, regardless of fault of either the employer or employee, for disabilities arising out of and in the course of employment.' The philosophy behind compensation liability is belief in the
wisdom of providing financial and medical benefits which a community would feel obligated to provide for the victims of workconnected injuries and of allocating the burden of those payments
to the most
appropriate source of payment, the consumer of the
2
product.
The theory supporting legislation providing for compensation to
employees for disability, or to their dependents in case of death, due
to occupational disease should be the same as in the case of compensation for disabilities or death due to accidental injuries. In either
case, the cost is borne by the industry which caused the disability
and then passed on to the public in the form of added costs for commodities, materials or services.
Compensation for occupational disease is a relatively new phase
of the workmen's compensation law. The reason for this is that
until the utilization by modem industry of various chemicals, compounds and minerals, and of manufacturing processes creating certain
dusts and fumes, such diseases were practically unknown. Since
accidental injuries were known from earliest times, it is only natural
that legislation dealing with the problems they present should have
preceded legislation relating to occupational diseases. 3
4
Kentucky enacted its first Workmen's Compensation Act in 1914.
This act was declared unconstitutional on the ground that it was a
compulsory system violating section 54 of the Kentucky Constitution.5 Again in 1916, a Workmen's Compensation Act was passed
by the Kentucky General Assembly," and it was unanimously declared constitutional by the Kentucky Court of Appeals. 7 However,
this act contained no provisions allowing recovery for any occupational disease, not even silicosis.
1 Tyler-Couch Constr. Co. v. Elmore, 264 S.W.2d 56 (Ky. 1954).
2 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 2-20 (1952).
3
Angerstein, Legal Aspects of Occupational Disease," 18 Rocky Mt. L.
Rev. 240 (1946).
4 Ky. Acts 1914, ch. 73.
5 Kentucky State Journal Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Bd., 161 Ky.
562, 170 S.W. 1166 (1914), rehearing denied, 162 Ky. 387, 172 S.W. 674
(1915).
oKy. Acts 1916 ch. 33.
7 Greene v. Cadwel, 170 Ky. 571, 186 S.W. 648 (1916).
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In 1924, disability from inhalation in mines of noxious gases,
smoke or bad air was made compensable.8 The 1934 amendment to
this legislation provided:
[E]mployers and their employees engaged in the operation of glass
manufacturing plants, quarries, sand mines or in the manufacture,
treating or handling of sand may, with respect to the disease of silicosis caused by the inhalation of silica dust, . . . voluntarily [by joint
application] subject themselves to the Act as to such disease. 9

By amendment in 1944,10 this provision for voluntary coverage in cases

involving silicosis was enlarged to include "any employers and their
employees" and detailed procedures were set up relating to claims for
compensation for disability or death resulting from the disease of
silicosis. 11
In 1956, KRS section 342.316 was given its present form and became what is now commonly referred to as the Occupational Disease
Act. This paper is primarily concerned with the following provisions of the act:
(1) "Occupational Disease" as used in this chapter means a disease
arising out of and in the course of the employment Ordinary disease
of life to which the general public is equally exposed outside of the
employment shall not be compensable, except where such diseases
follow as an incident of an occupational disease as defined in this
section.
(a) A disease shall be deemed to arise out of the employment only
if there is apparent to the rational mind, upon consideration of all
the circumstances, a direct casual [sic] connection between the
condition under which the work is performed and the occupational
disease, and which can be seen to have followed as a natural incident
of the work as a result of the exposure occasioned [sic] by the
nature of the employment and which can be fairly traced to the employment as the proximate cause, and which does not come from
a hazard to which workmen would have been equally exposed outside of the employment. The disease shall be incidental to the
character of the business and not independent of the relationship
of employer and employee. The disease need not have been foreseen or expected but, after its contraction, it must appear to have
bad its origin in a risk connected with the employment and to have
flowed from that source as a rational consequence.

In interpreting the meaning of these provisions, and in trying to
determine what disabilities will be compensable thereunder, it is
necessary to ascertain the intent of the legislature in passing the
SKy. Acts 1924, ch. 70, presently Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.005 (1959) (hereinafter referred to as KRS).
9 Ky. Acts 1934, ch. 89, § 1.
loKy. Acts 1944, ch. 82.
11 Detailed provisions for procedures in silicosis cases were added to KRS
§ 342.315 by the 1944 Act. Prior to the 1946 session, the Legislative Research Commission assigned the number KRS § 342.316 to portions of the
1944 Act.
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amendment. Since there is no legislative history, such as committee
reports and records of hearings relating to the adoption of the
amendment, it is virtually impossible to find any objective factors
which would indicate the intent of the legislature. It should also be
noted that, since the enactment of this statute, there have been no
cases before the Workmen's Compensation Board involving occupational diseases other than silicosis, which is specifically referred to
as an occupational disease in KRS section 42.316(4) & (6). Therefore, the only avenue open in an inquiry of this kind is an examination of the case law on the problem existing at the time the amendment was enacted.
There were no common-law rules allowing workmen's compensation for accidental injuries nor for occupational disease. However,
at common-law, the employer was held liable to his employee for
personal injuries and for a disease sustained by him by reason of the
employer's negligence, except insofar as the latter's liability might be
risk, conaffected by the application of the doctrines of assumed
12
tributory negligence and the fellow servant doctrine.
Prior to the 1956 amendment, all diseases, occupational or otherwise, were excluded from the operation of the Workmen's Compensation Act unless the disease was "the natural and direct result of a
traumatic injury by accident," 13 with the exception of silicosis in the
event both the employer and employee voluntarily subjected themselves to coverage under KRS section 342.005(2) as it read before
the 1956 amendment. Thus, it might be said that "occupational disease" has been synonymous with "non-compensability" in Kentucky
in a large portion of the cases.
We are entitled to conjecture that the Kentucky legislature got
the language of its 1956 Act 14 from either the Virginia, 15 Indiana, 16
or Illinois 17 statute, since they are identical with our own. However,
it seems clear that the language is ultimately traceable to the opinion
of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in an early workmen's compensation case involving an accidental injury. In that case the deceased
received fatal injuries inflicted by a fellow employee who was in an
intoxicated frenzy of passion. The court stated:
The first question is whether the deceased received an "injury
arising out of and in the course of his employment," within the
In order that there may be recovery
meaning of those words ....
12Jellico Coal Co. v. Adkins, 197 Ky. 684, 247 S.W. 972 (1923); 1 Lar-

son, op. cit. supra note 2, § 41.
13 Tafel Electric Co. v .Scherle, 295 Ky. 99, 173 S.W.2d 810, 811 (1943).
14KRS § 342.316 (1)

(1959).

15 Va. Code Ann. tit. 65, § 42 (1950, Supp. 1958).
10 Bums Ind. Stat. § 40-2206 (1952).
171i. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, § 172.36 (1957).
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the injury must both arise out of and also be received in the course
It is sufficient to say
of the employment. Neither alone is enough ....
that an injury received "in the course of" the employment when it
comes while the workman is doing the duty which he is employed
to perform. It arises "out of" the employment, when there is apparent to the rational mind upon consideration of all the circumstances, a casual connection between the conditions under which the
work is required to be performed and the resulting injury. Under
this test, if the injury can be seen to have followed as a natural
incident of the work and to have been contemplated by a reasonable
person familiar with the whole situation as a result of the exposure
occasioned by the nature of the employment, then it arises "out of"
the employment. But it excludes an injury which cannot fairly be
traced to the employment as a contributing proximate cause and
which comes from a hazard to which the workmen would have been
equally exposed apart from the employment. The causative danger
must be peculiar to the work and not common to the neighborhood. It must be incidental to the character of the business and
not independent of the relation of master and servant. It need not
have been foreseen or expected, but after the event it must appear
to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment, and
to have flowed from that source as a rational consquence.1 s

This opinion is quoted extensively in order to show the similarity
between certain phrases in the Massachusetts court's opinion and
those in the Kentucky Act. 19 However, the Massachusetts court was

faced, not with an occupational disease claim, but rather with a
claim for accidental injuries. Essentially the only difference between
the wording of the above opinion and the wording of the Kentucky

Act is the substitution of the words "occupational disease" for the
word "injury." Therefore, the rules of law as above given by that
court for the determination of whether an accidental injury arose

out of an employee's employment should be equally applicable in
determining whether an occupational disease arose out of the employment.
In determining the application of the Kentucky Occupational
Disease Act, 20 the first determination to be made is whether the disability complained of is the result of a disease. If it is caused by a
disease which is not itself the result of a traumatic injury, then we
are faced with the task of applying the criteria set out in the Act

for determining whether it is a compensable disability.
The traditional distinction between injury and disease has been
the element of time-definiteness. 21 If the cause of the disability can

be traced to a specific date, or within a limited and identifiable period,

it is an injury.22 Whereas, if the disability had a gradual develop18

In re McNicol, 215 Mass. 497, 102 N.E. 697 (1913).
19KRS § 342.316 (1) (1959).
20 Ibid.
21 Ilillerich & Bradsby Co. v. Parker, 267 S.W.2d 746 (Ky. 1954).
22 Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Sexton, 242 Ky. 266, 46 S.W.2d 87 (1932).
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ment, the cause is a disease. 23 It should be noted that the purpose
of distinguishing injury and disease in these cases has usually been
to defeat compensation claims on the ground that there was not an
accidental injury, where there was no statutory provision for compensation for disabilities arising from occupational diseases.
Under "general coverage"24 statutes such as KRS section 842.316,
the important boundary now becomes, not the separation of occupational disease from accidental injury, because both are compensable,
but rather the separation of occupational diseases from diseases which
are common to mankind and not distinctively associated with the
employment. Thus, the element of gradualness, so heavily stressed
in definitions contrived to distinguish accidental injuries from occupational diseases, loses some of its importance.
The criterion for determining whether a disease is an occupational
one and compensable under the Act is whether it "arises out of and
in the course of the employment."25 The terms "arising out of" and
"in the course of" are not synonymous and if either of these elements is absent, there can be no recovery.20 The phrase "in the course
of' the employment refers to the time, place and circumstances of
the occurrence. 27 Thus, a disability occurs "in the course of' the employment, if the employee is doing what a man so employed may
reasonably be expected to do within the time during which he is
employed and at a place where he may reasonably be expected to
be during that time. 28 While seemingly simple in its terms, the test
has not received consistent application.2 9 However, in view of the
fact that the Kentucky legislature went to great length in setting up
the criteria for determining whether a disease "arose out of" the employment, the remainder of this paper will be devoted to consideration of the proper application of this phrase.
The words "arising out of" the employment refer to the cause of
the disability.30 In order for a disease to be deemed to "arise out of"
the employment within the meaning of KRS section 342.316, there
must be, among other things, a direct casual connection between
23

Kentucky Stone Co. v. Phillips, 294 Ky. 576, 172 S.W.2d 216 (1943).
There are two types of coverage statutes: "general coverage" and "schedule
coverage." 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation, § 41.11 (1952).
25KRS
§ 342.316 (1) (1959).
2
0Stapleton v. Fork Junction Coal Co., 247 S.W.2d 372 (Ky. 1952).
27 Ibid.
2sPhil Hollenbach Co. v. Hollenbach, 181 Ky. 262, 281, 204 S.W. 152,
160 (1918).
29 For various applications of the test see: Note, "Workmen's Compensation
the 'Going and Coming' Rule and Its Exceptions in Kentucky," 47 Ky. L. J.
420 (1959); Note, "Workmen's Compensation-Arising out of and in the Course
of Employment," 47 Ky. L. J. 429, 430-433 (1959).
30 Stapleton v. Fork Junction Coal Co., 247 S.W.2d 372 (Ky. 1952).
24
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the "conditions" under which the work is performed and the occupational disease, and it must follow as a natural incident of the
work as a result of the exposure occasioned by the "nature" of the
employment.
What is meant by "nature" and by "conditions" of employment
might be best illustrated by reference to a noted New York decision. 31
In that case, the claimant was a theater cashier. Her feet became
numb and weak because of alternating heat and cold which resulted
from turning an electric heater in the ticket booth on and off. New
York had a statute which specifically named certain diseases as
occupational diseases. There was also a general provision for compensation for all occupational diseases if contracted in one of the
industries to which the Workmen's Compensation Law pertained.
The Industrial Board found the disease to be an occupational one
due to the nature of the employment and awarded compensation.
The Court of Appeals affirmed because the award could be sustained as one for injury, but denied that the claimant had an occupational disease within the meaning of the New York statute. The
court stated:
[A]n occupational disease is one which results from the nature of
the employment, and by nature is meant, not those conditions brought
about by the failure of the employer to furnish a safe place to work,
but conditions to which all employees of a class are subject, and
which produce the disease as a natural incident of a particular
occupation, and attach to that occupation a hazard which distin-

guishes it from the usual run of occupations and is in excess of the
hazard attending employment in general.
. . . Her occupation was that of handling cash and theater tickets,
and it is obvious that this work in and of itself could not have caused
the . . . disease. The "disease" which befell her, therefore, was
caused not by the nature of her employment, but by the failure of
her employer
to furnish her with a proper and safe place in which
32
to work.

Thus, the "nature" of the employment refers to the type of work done
(i.e., selling tickets and handling money) and "conditions" refer to
the environment (i.e., working in an exposed place requiring the use
of a heater and resulting in alternating heat and cold).
Should the Kentucky courts follow what might be called the
"New York rule" as laid out in the Goldberg case, that in order to be
compensable the disease must result from the type of work done,
compensation for disability resulting from disease would be severely
31 Goldberg v. 954 Marcy Corp., 276 N.Y. 313, 12 N.E.2d 311 (1938).
See also Harman v. Republic Aviation Corp., 298 N.Y. 285, 82 N.E.2d 785
(1948).
32
Goldberg v. 954 Marcy Corp., 276 N.Y. 313,

(1938).

,

12 N.E.2d 311, 313
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limited. However, it is believed that the Kentucky court should
not follow this rule for two reasons: (1) the language of the Kentucky Occupational Disease Act is ultimately traceable to the McNicol case3 3 which did not require that the injury result from the
"nature of the employment," at least within the meaning of the
Goldberg case;34 and (2) the Kentucky courts when dealing with injuries have not required that they result from the "nature of the
employment."
The deceased in the McNicol case was a checker in the employ
of a firm of importers and was fatally injured when struck by a fellow employee who was intoxicated. The nature of the employment
was checking for the importers and the condition was working with
the intoxicated employee. The court allowed compensation, yet it
cannot be said that there was a risk that this type of injury would
arise from the nature of the employment. The deceased was a checker,
not a bar-tender. Therefore, the logical deduction would be that the
court felt it was not necessary that the injury result from the "nature
of the employment," regardless of the fact that these words are used
in their test for "arising out of" the employment, but rather it was
sufficient that the injury resulted from the "conditions of the employment." This is further evidenced by the following statement of
the Massachusetts court:
Although it may be that upon the facts here disclosed a liability
on the part of the defendant for negligence .

.

. might have arisen,

this decision does not rest upon that ground, but upon the causal
connection between the injury of the deceased and the
conditions
under which the defendant required him to work.35 [Emphasis
added.]
If the conclusion that the language of the Kentucky Occupational
Diseatse Act is traceable to the McNicol case is correct, it would
seem to follow that since the words "nature of the employment"
were used in a different way in that case from the usage in the

Goldberg case, the Kentucky court should not follow the Goldberg
case in determining whether a disease followed as a natural incident
of the work as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of
the employment.
The Kentucky courts have consistently allowed compensation
claims for injuries resulting from the "conditions of the employment," which had no relation to the "nature of the employment."
re McNicol, 215 Mass. 497, 102 N.E. 697 (1913).
4Hereafter, when the words "nature" or "condition" of the employment
are used,
they will be used as in the Goldberg case in note 33 supra.
35
In re McNicol, 215 Mass 497,
, 102 N.E. 697, 698 (1913).
331n
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Phil Hollenbach Co. v. Hollenbach" provides a classic example substantiating the above proposition. Hollenbach worked as a cellar
foreman in a wholesale liquor business. The business used electric
lights for illuminating the toilet. On the day of the accident, he had
been engaged in bottling wines and placing them upon shelves
in the basement. At the end of the day, in preparation for going
home, Hollenbach went to the wash basin and was electrocuted when
he came in contact with an uninsulated, electrically charged wire
placed there as a prank by a fellow employee. The court cited the
"nature' 'and "conditions" requirement from the "arising out of' test
in the McNicol case, yet they allowed compensation. It is evident
that the death did not result from the "nature of the employment,"
but rather was the result of one of the "conditions of the employment."37
Indiana has a statute which is identical with Kentucky's,3 8 yet
the Indiana courts have for all practical purposes eliminated the
"nature" requirement. In Schwitzer-Cummins Co. v. Hacker,39 the
claimant operated two milling machines equipped with cutting wheels
which were used to cut off end portions of cast iron bars. Prior to
cutting, the bars were painted with a paint composed of iron oxide
and zinc chromate. When subjected to heat in the cutting process,
the zinc chromate turned into an oxide which could be irritating
to the lung tissues. There were also dry grinders in the room using
no wet or oil solutions and the ventilation was sub-standard. The
claimant contracted bronchiectasis and the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Board allowed recovery, finding that it was an occupational disease within the meaning of the Indiana statute.
It is apparent that the disease did not result from the nature of
the employment, but rather was caused by the conditions in this
particular work place resulting
from the employer's failure to use
40
available safety measures.

The Kentucky court should construe the Kentucky statute simi36181 Ky. 262, 204 S.W. 152 (1918).
37 F
other Kentucky cases which did not require that the injury arise
out of the nature of the employment, see Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., v. Bums,
290 S.W.2d 836 (Ky. 1956) (injury resulting from horseplay in which employer acquiesced); Clear Fork Coal Co. v. Roberts, 279 S.W.2d 797 (K
1955)

(injury occurring during ride from bathhouse to mine in private truck);

Adams v. Bryant, 274 S.W.2d 791 (Ky. 1955) (injury resulting from efforts
to rescue fellow worker under direction of employer); Bales v. Covington,
312 Ky. 551, 228 S.W.2d 446 (1950) (logger killed by lightning while putting horses in barn on high ridge).
38 See notes 14 & 16 supra.
39 124 Ind. 87, 112 N.E.2d 221 (1953). Compare Stewart-Warner Corp.
v. Industrial Comm'n, 376 IM. 141, 83 N.E.2d 196 (1941).
40 From the opinion we have no direct characterization of the conditions as
a whole in the industry. However, from the wording of the opinion, it is evi-

NoTEs
larly. If it requires that a disease result from the "nature of the employment," compensation for occupational diseases would be severely
limited, and the purpose of enacting a "general coverage" statute
such as ours would be largely defeated.
The law as applied to injury cases should be equally applicable
to cases involving diseases. The purpose of compensating for disease and for injury is the same. There is no logical reason why a
disease should go uncompensated when under similar circumstances
an injury would not. When enacting our statute, the Kentucky
legislature must have been cognizant of the fact that the creeping,
incidious progress of disease often may be more devastating, crippling and lethal to a workman than the disablement resulting from an
accidental physical injury, and that to deny compensation under
such circumstances would be untenable.
The Kentucky Occupational Disease Act is a practical statute with
a definite humane purpose. It should be applied in the spirit of its
objective and not shrouded in a haze of overtechnical interpretations.
Leslie D. Aberson*
dent that the court was thinking in terms of tracing the cause of the injury to
the conditions of the employment within the meaning of the Goldberg case.
The court spoke of the use of "dry grinders using n6 wet or oil solutions,"
the failure to use "blowers" and the absence of "ventilation," which would lead
us to believe that these precautions were taken in the industry as a whole. 112
N.E.2d at 223. This is also substantiated by the fact that this case arose in 1951,
a period when employers were cognizant of particular work hazards.
The following quotation from the opinion also dealt specifically with this
problem (112 N.E.2d at 224):
[Tihe appellant . . . appears to urge upon us a limitation of the
scope and a plication of the Act to a few diseases of an unusual
nature which are natural incidents of employment in a particular
calling or occupation, and which are from common experience
known to be usual and customary incidents to such callings or
occupations. The ultimate result of the acceptance and approval
by us of such a premise would be establishment of the doctrine
that the . . . Act should be construed as if the same required
the scheduling or specific designation of certain particular diseases
as falling within its provisions and that such diseases only would
be compensable. . . . [Sluch was not the intent or the spirit
of the Act...
The court also cited with approval the dissent in McGill Mfg. Co. v. Dodd,
116 Ind. App. 66, 59 N.E.2d 899 (1945). In that case, the majority applied
the statute strictly, as the New York statute was applied in the Goldberg case,
but the dissent stated that the statute should be applied liberally and favored
the application of the rule that it is sufficient that the disease result from
the "conditions" of the employment and not be restricted to the "nature" of the
employment.
Therefore, after a close reading of the opinion in the Schwitzer-Cummins
Co. case and after consideration of the period in which this case arose, we
are lead to but one conclusion-that the Indiana court does not require that
the disease result from the "nature" of the employment within the meaning
of the Goldberg case.
* Third-year student in University of Kentucky College of Law.

